FRICKER EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE PDF
In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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While ethical knowledge remains uncodifiable, on this account it can, with appropriate sensitivity-training, be sufficiently sure to foster wise judgement, yet sufficiently open to accommodate and evaluate surprises. Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.
Added to PP index Total downloads 11, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 78 4, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Michael Brady – – Analysis 69 2: Gloria Origgi – – Social Epistemology 26 2: But this is a major shift: Kusch – – Mind Thus, too, where Fricker holds ethics and politics apart, I see them as co-constitutive in ways that the “social imaginary” better captures.
With hermeneutical injustice, speakers’ knowledge claims fall into lacunae in the available conceptual resources, thus blocking their capacity to interpret, and thence to understand or claim a hearing for their experiences.
Moreover, the book is beautifully written” –Martin Kusch, Mind “In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of ‘looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice’ comes to fruition Fellows of the British Academy elected in David Enoch – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1: Sections of some chapters have been published elsewhere, but the material presented here is largely new, and either way, this is a path-breaking study.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness. Ethicsfeminist epistemologyfeminism.
Miranda Fricker – Wikipedia
Analogous failures to correct for responses “saturated with racist constructions of the ‘Negro'” 90 permeate the testimonial injustices in To Kill a Mockingbirddemonstrating — as Fricker convincingly shows — that “testimonial responsibility requires a distinctly reflexive social awareness” 91, italics original. Power and the Ethics of Knowing — Miranda Fricker.
Rather than viewing them as epistemically-morally-politically pernicious forms of hasty generalization by contrast, say, with Gadamerian pre-judgements or putatively more benign practices of categorization, Fricker argues plausibly for a “neutral” sense of stereotype which catches their frequent reliability as part of a “hearer’s rational resources” in making credibility judgements.
Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement “Miranda Fricker’s excellent monograph occupies some relatively uncharted philosophical territory, being ‘neither straightforwardly a work of ethics nor straightforwardly a work of epistemology’, but instead seeking to ‘[renegotiate] a stretch of the border between these two regions’ Oxford University Press Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Admittedly, this shift comes about on ground prepared by a cluster of projects: The book consists of an introduction, seven chapters, and a brief conclusion.
Yet they operate differently in that testimonial injustice is an individual-to-individual harm, reliant though it is on features of social-group identity, whereas hermeneutical injustice, with its roots in the collective hermeneutical resource, invokes different culpability issues, some of which refer to institutional, social policies and practices held in place, and tacitly justified, by what I call an instituted social imaginary.
In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Ethics of Belief in Epistemology. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice 6. They carry the power to destroy a would-be knower’s confidence for engaging in the trustful conversations of which epistemic communities at their best are made. We are social creatures-something that tends to be forgotten by traditional analytic epistemology. Within this rich store of examples, ever more intricate readings of Tom Robinson, the wrongfully accused black man in Harper Lee’s novel, are particularly effective in exposing the effects of stereotypes in excluding members of certain social “kinds” from relations of trust, contributing to their degradation qua knowers, “undermining them in their very humanity” Hermeneutical Injustice Conclusion Index.
Christopher Hookway – – Episteme 7 2: Our Faithfulness to the Past Sue Campbell.
Retrieved from ” https: Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology. Yet although a collective social imagination can be “an ethical and epistemic liability” it is also, in her view, a “mighty resource for social change” With this friicker Miranda Fricker has opened space for the new meanings the “more squarely political” analysis will require. The questions admit of no easy answers and Fricker supplies none, although she rightly insists that a “‘vulgar’ relativist” resistance to passing moral judgement on other cultures “is incoherent” In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: Kristie Dotson – – Hypatia 26 2: Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: University Press Scholarship Online.
Epistemic Injustice Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker Fricoer work on a new subject in philosophy Fascinating exploration of the relationship between knowledge and power Virtue epistemology is a hot topic in philosophy. The Virtue of Testimonial Justice 5. Sign in to use this feature. Hence the very idea of epistemic injustice is innovative to the point of initiating a conceptual shift in epistemology as it has traditionally been practiced.